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Beware: a woman is looking after your car

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Abstract

There has been little research on the association between behaviors, gender and usufruct rights in informal settings. Using a unique database from an underprivileged population, who informally look after cars parked in the streets, we analyze the behaviors women and men exhibit when they interact with other people in the street. We find that men tend to commit acts of physical aggression more than women when they have to defend their usufruct right. But, surprisingly, though theory and applied literature suggests the contrary, we found that women are more likely to react aggressively than men, when drivers underpay in this voluntary payment market. Building a Type Index of *cuidacoches* (indicator of attitude and external appearance), we explore association between aggressive behavior and this Type Index.

JEL: I3, J16, J23

Keywords: gender, poverty, self-employment, violence, aggressiveness

1 Introduction

The analysis of informal labor markets in public spaces is of paramount importance for the understanding of contemporary violent phenomena. Such situations are found in many developing countries where vehicles are washed or looked after without any regulation, streets where garbage is picked up in exchange for a voluntary financial compensation or markets where goods are sold in informally assigned areas. The phenomenon of informal labor markets in the streets, the violence that may be involved and how to deal with it, is also present in developed countries, where squeegee men may informally wipe windscreens of cars stopped in traffic of large cities.

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In most Latin American countries we find the so-called *cuidacoches*: people who in an unsolicited way work on the street looking after parked cars in the hopes of getting a tip in return. Several attempts have been made to ban, regulate and legislate this practice, which can be known by different names in each country: from the *viene-viene* or *franeleros* in Mexico, the *cuidaaautos* or *guardias* in Chile, the *franelinhas* in Brasil, the *celadores*, *vigilantes* or *guachimanes* in Colombia, the *cuidacarros* in Peru, the *trapitos* in Argentina, all the way to the *cuidacoches* in Uruguay, just to name a few.

Uruguay's capital city has experienced a boom in the number of *cuidacoches* in the last two decades, which is what makes it especially appealing to study the dynamics of this informal market. Moreover, another aspect that makes Montevideo particularly interesting is that its local government –Intendencia Municipal de Montevideo (IMM)– has issued a policy aimed at regulating this market, which consists in handing out legal permits. Through this, any *cuidacoches* can request to the authorities the exclusive right to work at a certain block.

Cabrera and Cid (2014) make a first approach to the *cuidacoches* labor market. For this purpose, they construct a database of 520 *cuidacoches* from Montevideo. They focus on the mechanisms that led the *cuidacoches* to legalize their job. They find that in spite of the benefits to legalize their work through the IMM policy, half of the *cuidacoches* prefer to remain informal. Besides, those who legalize themselves, report that having the exclusive usufruct right to work at a certain block is the main benefit of having the work permit.

In this paper, we build on Cabrera and Cid (2014) by focusing on the *cuidacoches*' behavioral differences between women and men, and by expanding their database with more observations. Most studies, using varied methods such as laboratory experiments, observations, self-reported and peer-reported behavior, demonstrate that men are more aggressive than women in case of overall direct, physical and verbal aggression (Cross and Campbell 2011). This result holds across diverse cultures and the gender difference becomes larger as the risk associated with the aggression is higher (Archer 2004). In our study, we find that when a *cuidacoches* has to defend their place in the block against the invasion of other *cuidacoches*, men tend to commit more acts of physical aggression than women. While this finding is consistent with the forecasts of theory and applied literature, strikingly, we find that female *cuidacoches* are significantly more likely to react aggressively in terms of insults, threats and direct minor aggressions to the parked car, in comparison with males. This novel finding may show the existence of some kind of evolutionary process towards an equilibrium of few – there's a proportion of only one woman out of ten males in this market – and more aggressive women. Interestingly, this may shed light about the gender dynamics in deeply vulnerable environments.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on gender differences in aggressiveness. Section III describes the *cuidacoches* labor market. Section IV presents the data and Section V the main results. Section VI discusses the implications of the evidence found.

2 Literature Review

Archer (2004) offers a comprehensive summary of sex differences in aggression, measured through self-reports, observations, peer reports, and teacher reports involving children and adults. Men seem to be more aggressive than women and this result holds across diverse cultures. Generally, the effect sizes for verbal aggression are smaller than those for direct and physical aggression (Archer 2004; Cross and Campbell 2011).

In the case of indirect aggression, which refers to acts such as spreading stories, excluding and stigmatizing, the results vary depending on the measurement method. With some methods women show higher indirect aggression than men and in other cases there is no gender difference (Archer 2004; Cross and Campbell 2011; Hess and Hagen 2006). The difference in the female direction appears in childhood and adolescence, and it reduces when adulthood (Archer 2009).

The gender differences in aggression have been generally explained by diverse theoretical frameworks, which complement each other. A first theory relies on sexual selection. It explains the higher levels of competitiveness in males by their lower parental investment (fathers invest less than mothers in the care of his offspring). As females show higher parental investment, they become a scarce resource, and male have to compete against each other for reproductive access. The degree of risk an individual is prepared to take during a conflict is identified as the crucial difference between the sexes. The greater variation in male than female reproductive success leads to more intense male competition: it is typical of mammals (Archer 2004; 2009). “Therefore, sex differences in aggression are viewed as characteristic of humans, to be found across cultures. They arise at a particular point in development, either early in postnatal life or at puberty, and are maximal during the peak years of sexual activity. They are greater for risky forms of aggression, rather than involving a difference in arousal to anger” (Archer 2004).

Furthermore, from a biological approach, there are sexually dimorphic neuroendocrine mechanisms, underlying aggression. There is a prenatal different exposure to sex hormones that is of great importance for personal traits such as empathy, altruism, cooperativeness and risk taking behavior (Staniloiu and Markowitsch 2012).

The social role theory supports that behavioral gender differences are based on the historical division of labor between the sexes and the relating roles men and women assume in the society. “Boys but not girls learn that aggressive responding is appropriate as part of a set of instrumental behaviors that fit them better for the masculine role. Expectancies associated with the masculine role maintain aggression as part of an instrumental set of responses, and expectancies associated with the feminine role inhibit it as part of an expressive set of responses” (Archer 2004).

Following the literature on gender differences in aggressiveness, the present study aims to examine the gender variations in different types of aggressiveness among the *cuidacoches* workers. Testing the validity of main-stream theories, this work contributes to the existing literature on gender differences in behavior, with focus on underprivileged informal workers.

3 The *cuidacoches* labor market

The people who work as *cuidacoches* are self-employed and are not constrained to a fixed schedule. They wear a reflective jacket so that people can identify them, stand in a visible spot on the street and take care of the parked cars. Usually, they also assist people finding a parking space and guide them during the parking maneuver. In some cases, there can be more than one *cuidacoches* in the same block, in which case they settle the issue of how to distribute the work themselves. The vast majority of *cuidacoches* work in the capital city of the country, where half of the country's population is concentrated.

The *cuidacoches* market experienced a sudden growth after 2002, when the country suffered a severe economic crisis. The economic downturn pushed up the percentage of population under the poverty line from 19% after the crisis to 31% in 2003.¹ In this context, the *cuidacoches*'s labor market absorbed in most cases unskilled workers who were willing to accept the precarious conditions of this informal job. In fact, the occupational category that includes the *cuidacoches* and other informal workers that work on the street, increased sharply from something more than 650 workers in 2001 to about 2.300 in 2003.²

After the economic recovery, instead of dismantling, the market has consolidated, in a context of sustained growth of car sales. In particular, the vehicle fleet of Montevideo more than doubled between 2002 and 2016, reaching more than 540.000 vehicles.³ In this context, the estimated number of *cuidacoches*'s stood at 2.000⁴, according to the latest data of the *Encuesta Continua de Hogares* (2014).

For its part, the government has promoted the regulation of the *cuidacoches* under an active policy. To register themselves, the *cuidacoches* has to present their identity card, health card, criminal records and passport photo. The registered *cuidacoches* have the usufruct right in her area, which means the police will provide protection in the case that another *cuidacoches* wants to work in that area. Besides, with the payment of an additional tax, the *cuidacoches* have the possibility of accessing to health assistance (which is extended to their

¹Following the methodology applied by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* in 2002 (Amarante and Vigorito, 2006)

²Author's own calculations based on the *Encuesta Continua de Hogares* data published by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística*. The occupational category considered includes: *cuidacoches*, shoeshine boy, billsticker and squeegee man.

³According to the *Observatorio de Tránsito (Intendencia Municipal de Montevideo)* and SUCIVE.

⁴Ibid.

family as well).

Furthermore, the government encouraged a program that consists of visiting the *cuidacoches* and giving them the proper information regarding how to get the working permit. Despite the government policy, about half of them remain as informal workers.⁵

4 Data

Procedure. We designed a specific survey and implemented it in Montevideo in two waves. The first one was conducted in June-July 2013 with 520 observations (Cabrera and Cid 2014). The second wave of interviews took place in October-November 2013 with another 204 observations. Our final estimation sample included 724 observations.

In May 2013, an initial outline of the geographical distribution of the *cuidacoches* along the city was done. Based on this approach, we defined different zones with the same number of potential *cuidacoches*. The interviewers were equally allocated among these zones. We made a pilot test of the survey that helped us improve the accuracy of some questions. To stimulate the person to answer the questionnaire, we emphasized the strict academic and research purpose of the survey. In order to encourage people to participate, we provided them with a lottery ticket number with small prizes. We determined that, in the case that at the time of the interview there were more than one *cuidacoches* in the street, the interviewer would conduct the interview to the one they considered the ‘owner of the area’. Interviews were carried out between 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. from Monday to Friday.

Questionnaire. The form were filled out by interviewers who were hired and trained by the research team. The questionnaire included socioeconomic data on the *cuidacoches*, questions related to their work decisions and aspirations and to their behavior at work. In a section reserved for the interviewer there were questions regarding the external appearance of the *cuidacoches*. These variables were four binary indicators: physical appearance of the person, poor denture condition, being under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the moment of the interview and having used poor language during the interview. With these variables we constructed the Type Index that indicates the physical appearance of the person, taking values from 0 to 4.

Participants. In Table 1 we include the definition and description of the main outcomes considered in this work and the descriptive statistics of the *cuidacoches* population that we study.

There are 647 males and 76 females (one observation is missing in gender) in the sample, so that women represent only 11% of the total *cuidacoches* workforce. This fact is consistent with vast literature that argues that the social identity factor influences the decisions and behaviors of people (Akerlof and

⁵Cabrera and Cid 2014.

Kranton 2000 and 2005; Goldin 2002). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) show that one’s identity, defined as one’s sense of belonging to a social category (which includes one’s gender identity) could be an important determinant on economic outcomes. In particular, social norms regarding what is appropriate for each gender to do may influence women and men: deviating from the behavior that is expected for one’s social category has a negative impact on the utility function. This fact could explain why women may avoid their participation in the market of *cuidacoches*.

The proportion of legalized workers is 48% and the *cuidacoches* have on average roughly 6.6 years of education. The 24% of the sample can save some money and 11% of the surveyed population is homeless. On average they have been working as *cuidacoches* for 8 years and a large proportion of them have been working in the same zone. About 76% of the sample has health insurance – public health is free for deeply poor people –, and 30% of the population has dependent minor children. For the vast majority (85%) of the workers, the earnings as *cuidacoches* represent their main income source.

As it is shown in Table 2, there is no significant difference between women and man on main characteristics, except for work permit, savings and health insurance. Being a woman increases 19 percentage points the probability of having the work permit and rises slightly (1 percent) the probability of having health insurance. On the other hand, men save 10% more than women.

Concerning income, women earn on average \$ 8520 (USD 284) and men \$ 9102 (USD 303) monthly (see Table 2). Figure 1 displays the association between income and age by gender. Income is strongly and negatively correlated with age both for women and men. Figure 2 graphs kernel density of daily income.

Figure 3 shows the correlation between income and the time working as *cuidacoches*. It seems that income does not vary with the number of years working in the street.

5 Results

In order to test if men and women behave differently, we study gender reactions in two different situations: aggressive behaviors against drivers who don’t give sufficient money, and the use of physical violence against other *cuidacoches* in order to defend their place in the street.

In the case of violence against drivers, we use the information of the following question: “What would you do if somebody parks several times and leaves you a small or non-existing tip?” Response choices were: (1) “I continue working normally”, (2) “I do not greet him”, (3) “I tell him there are no parking spaces”, (4) “I look at him with a straight face”, (5) “I insult him”, (6) “I don’t take care of his car if somebody else damages or steals it”, and (7) “Next time I’ll

damage his car”.

Our analysis is based on the following linear regression:

$$R_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}WP_i + \beta_{2j}F_i + \beta_{3j}A_i + \beta_{4j}TI_i + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Were $R_{ij} = R_{i1}, R_{i2}, \dots, R_{i7}$ are each of the response choices to the question above, the i subscripts refer to each i individual, WP is the variable work permit, F is the variable female, A is the variable age, TI is the variable Type Index (the worse the type, the higher the index) and ϵ is a stochastic error term.

Table 3 shows that women are more likely to have negative reactions than men: only with one exception (“I do not greet him”), women present a positive and significant coefficient along all the negative reactions. Besides, as expected, there is a positive and significant correlation between the Type Index and negative reactions, which means that the scruffier the *cuidacoches* looks the higher tendency to have negative reactions.

In order to summarize the outcomes in a single measure, we create the Aggressive Behavior Index. This index is calculated as the simple average of three of the dichotomous variables obtained from the response choices presented in Table 3 that were considered as an aggressive reaction: “I insult him”, “I don’t take care of his car if somebody else damages or steals it” and “Next time I’ll damage his car”.

In Table 4 we present the coefficients from OLS regression models predicting the Aggressive Behavior Index. We look at the stability of the female coefficient after adding different control variables. According to these models, being a female *cuidacoches* increases the probability of having aggressive behaviors. The coefficient for women increased and remained significant after controlling for age, years of education, Type Index, work permit and homeless.

Now we turn to interpersonal physical violence against other *cuidacoches*. We create a Physical Violence Index. *Cuidacoches* were asked about the method they would choose to kick out someone who was trying to work in their area if he/she had a work permit. The index is constructed as the simple average of two dummy variables obtained from the answers to that question: “I will forcibly remove them by myself” and “I will forcibly remove them with the help of others”.

We run a linear OLS regression that explains the Physical Violence Index using the same variables as in the Aggressive Behavior Index model (equation 1). The results are shown in Table 5. Consistent with previous findings, women are not more likely than men to employ physical violence against other *cuidacoches*. The correlation is negative and significant at the 13% level: being female decreases the likelihood of exerting physical violence. When we include controls, the correlation remains negative, but is no longer statistically significant at the conventional levels.

Other remarkable result is that legalized workers are less likely to be violent, since they can call the municipality or the police in case someone else wants to work in their zone.

Table 6 presents bivariate correlations between the components of the Aggressive Behavior Index and the Type Index. As expected, most are significant and positive. We analyze the coefficient differences by gender. Women have higher coefficients than men in most of the cases.

We calculate the correlations between the Type Index and the aggressive behavior by age, separately for women and men (Figure 5). For women the correlation is greater than for men. The correlation strongly diminishes with age, which is more clearly for men.

It is important to note that the sample of women could be subject to a selection bias. Although there are no significant differences between women and men in all the observable variables (see Table 2) -with the exception of the likelihood of having the work permit and the health insurance-, we should go further on the analysis. To confront the existence of a selection bias we ought to compare female and male *cuidacoches* with women and men in the whole population. With adequate information we could determine if female *cuidacoches* are more violent than the average female population and the same comparison in the male case. Unfortunately, for the time being, we don't have enough information to do this study. However, it is interesting to note that the proportion of women *cuidacoches* in our sample is about 11%, while in the working population of the country that ratio is over 40%. Therefore, it seems to be that women choose to work as *cuidacoches* in a much lower proportion than men, and it is plausible that the kind of woman who decide to work in the streets as *cuidacoches* is, on average, more violent than the average man. This probable selection bias should be taken into account at analyzing the gender dynamics of the market of *cuidacoches* and at evaluating the surprising result that women *cuidacoches* are more likely to react aggressively than men with the drivers. This finding may shed light also to the exploration of similar mechanisms in other disadvantaged labor markets.

6 Discussion

In this paper we address the gender differences in aggressiveness in the *cuidacoches* labor market. We find that women react more aggressively than men, when they are not rewarded enough by the drivers. In addition, the Type Index also has a positive correlation with the aggressive behavior.

Apparently, this evidence is contrary to what most studies have shown, that women are less aggressive than men when it comes to direct aggression (verbal and physical). Following Campbell (2006), the main mediator of the sex difference in aggression is the fear, which is higher on women than men, as they are more afraid of retaliation. In the case of the *cuidacoches*, it is reasonable

to think that drivers that leave a small or non-existing tip are not parking in that place regularly, but occasionally. In this context, it can be expected that women do not feel scared to the occasionally drivers, that probably, may not retaliate.

It would be an interesting question to address in future research if there are other differences between women and men *cuidacoches* that have not been already measured and could be related to behavioral differences, such as mental health or self-esteem.

In respect of physical aggression, comparing their behavior with other *cuidacoches*, we evidence women are not more likely than men to use physical violence against other *cuidacoches*. In the absence of other controls, the correlation is significant and negative at 13%. Besides, having a worse aspect (higher Type Index) and not being legalized increases the probability of committing acts of physical aggression. As expected, the age has a negative correlation with the physical violence.

The present study provides valuable information about the *cuidacoches* and their heterogeneous behavior by gender, which should be taken into account in order to design or to guide public-policies aimed at this sector. As mentioned at the beginning of the study, the existence of this voluntary payment market of looking after cars is an extended phenomenon in many countries of Latin America.

The results may be useful also for other sectors with significant similarities to that of the *cuidacoches*. These sectors include people that work in the street doing different tasks in exchange for tips such as cleaning the windshields of the cars or juggling at the traffic lights. The novel results provided by the present study have implications to understand the dynamics in these sectors and may be a valuable input for social policies. Thus, these findings may shed light to the research and policy design in contexts where vulnerable workers strive for the informal ownership of a physical public space.

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Table 1 - Definition and description of variables

Variable	Description of variables	Mean	S.D	Min	Max	# Obs.
Age	Age in years	46.664	14.49	15	85	659
Female	=1 if the person is female and 0 otherwise	0.105	0.31	0	1	723
Work permit	= 1 if the person has a work permit and 0 otherwise	0.478	0.50	0	1	724
Years of education	Years of completed education	6.564	2.62	0	16	590
Savings	= 1 if the person has a remaining from his earnings and 0 otherwise	0.240	0.43	0	1	567
Homeless	= 1 if the person does not have house and 0 otherwise	0.105	0.31	0	1	724
Type index	Index composed of four dummy variables: physical appearance of the person, poor denture condition, being alcoholised or drugged at the moment of the interview, poor language used during the interview. The higher the index, the poorer the condition.	0.911	1.17	0	4	684
Time as <i>cuidacoches</i>	Number of months the person has worked as <i>cuidacoches</i>	100.355	89.44	0	480	714
Time as <i>cuidacoches</i> in this area	Number of months that the person has worked as <i>cuidacoches</i> in this area	74.502	78.55	0	456	717
Health insurance	= 1 if the person has health insurance and 0 otherwise	0.757	0.43	0	1	724
Minor children	= 1 if the person has children younger than 18 years and 0 otherwise	0.301	0.46	0	1	715
<i>Cuidacoches</i> main income	= 1 if the income as <i>cuidacoches</i> is the principal income he percieve and 0 otherwise	0.854	0.35	0	1	604
Work more hours	= 1 if the person would like to work more hours and 0 otherwise	0.315	0.46	0	1	724
Leave current job	= 1 if the person would like to stop working as a <i>Cuidadoches</i> 0 otherwise	0.638	0.48	0	1	724
Searching for a job	= 1 if the person is searching for a different job and 0 otherwise	0.315	0.46	0	1	724
Searching for a job to replace	= 1 if the person is searching for a job to replace the current job and 0 otherwise	0.620	0.49	0	1	216
Time in last job	Number of months the person worked in his last job	99.664	110.35	1	552	515

Table 2 - Mean comparison by gender of main characteristics

	Women	Men	Difference	p-value	# Obs.
Age	48,893 (12,748)	46,403 (14,670)	-2,490 (1.843)	0.177	659
Years of education	6,538 (2.699)	6,572 (2.614)	0,033 (0.345)	0.924	589
Work permit	0.645 (0.482)	0.459 (0.499)	-0.186 ^{***} (0.060)	0.002	723
Income	8519,867 (5168.744)	9102,155 (5262.660)	582,288 (642,115)	0.365	696
<i>Cuidacoches</i> main income	0.879 (0.33)	0.851 (0.36)	-0.028 (0.046)	0.547	603
Type index	0.760 (1.011)	0.929 (1.188)	0.169 (0.143)	0.237	684
Savings	0.150 (0.360)	0.251 (0.434)	0.101 [*] (0.058)	0.084	566
Homeless	0.066 (0.250)	0.108 (0.311)	0.042 (0.037)	0.252	723
Health insurance	0.842 (0.367)	0.747 (0.435)	-0.096 [*] (0.052)	0.066	723
Minor children	0.320 (0.470)	0.299 (0.458)	-0.021 (0.056)	0.707	714
Time as <i>cuidacoches</i>	105,787 (90.91)	99,780 (89.38)	-6,007 (10.93)	0.583	713
Time as <i>cuidacoches</i> in this area	80,400 (69.90)	73,834 (79.58)	-6,566 (9.596)	0.494	716
Time in last job	86,840 (92.804)	101,043 (112.075)	14,203 (16.428)	0.388	515

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The reported difference is the difference in means between women and men

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 3: Reaction when somebody parks several times and leaves you a small or non-existing tip

Dependent variable:							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	I continue working normally	I do not greet him	I tell him there is no parking spaces	I look at him with a straight face	I insult him	I do not take care of his car if somebody else damages or steals it	Next time I will damage his car
Female	-0.058 (0.261)	0.070 (0.156)	0.046* (0.071)	0.086** (0.025)	0.069*** (0.004)	0.068* (0.079)	0.014* (0.059)
Work permit	-0.062* (0.072)	-0.024 (0.461)	0.003 (0.862)	0.001 (0.965)	0.003 (0.858)	-0.002 (0.932)	0.002 (0.648)
Age	0.003** (0.016)	0.000 (0.662)	0.000 (0.947)	-0.001 (0.292)	-0.001 (0.172)	-0.000 (0.691)	-0.000 (0.503)
Type index	-0.030** (0.034)	0.028** (0.035)	0.031*** (0.000)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.033*** (0.000)	0.051*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.007)
r2	0.019	0.012	0.038	0.025	0.056	0.043	0.018
N	611	611	611	611	611	611	611

Notes: Following equation (2), each answer to the question 'What would you do if somebody parks several times and leaves you a little or none tip' are estimated. OLS estimations; *p*-values in parentheses.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 4: Women effect on the Aggressive Behavior Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.115**	0.138***	0.131**	0.141**	0.141**	0.142**
Age		-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
Years of education			-0.005	0.001	0.001	0.000
Type index				0.095***	0.095***	0.094***
Work permit					0.001	0.003
Homeless						0.026
# Observations	708	644	528	502	502	502

Notes: OLS estimation of the Aggressive Behavior Index. The aggressive behavior index is calculated as the simple average of three dichotomous variables obtained from the available answers to the question: 'What would you do if somebody parks several times and you a small or non-existing tip?'. The three answers averaged are: "I insult him", "I do not take care of his car if somebody else damages or steals it" and "Next time I will damage his car".

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 5 : Women effect on the physical violence index						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.129*	-0.105	-0.121	-0.106	-0.085	-0.083
Age		-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.007***
Years of education			-0.004	0.003	0.002	0.003
Type index				0.099***	0.087***	0.082***
Work permit					-0.150***	-0.140**
Homeless						0.102

Notes: OLS estimation of the physical violence index. The Physical Violence Index is calculated as the simple average of two binary variables obtained from the available answers to the question: 'Imagine you have a work permit. What would you do to expel other ilegal Cuidacoches from your zone?'. The answers averaged are: "I will forcibly remove them by myself" and "I will forcibly remove them with the help of others".

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 6: Bivariate correlations

	Men and Women				Men				Women			
	Insult	Do not take care	Damage	Type index	Insult	Do not take care	Damage	Type index	Insult	Do not take care	Damage	Type index
Insult	1				1				1			
Do not take care	0.0797 ^{**}	1			0.0528	1			0.171	1		
Damage	0.290 ^{***}	0.170 ^{***}	1		0.239 ^{***}	0.131 ^{***}	1		0.394 ^{***}	0.296 ^{**}	1	
Type index	0.184 ^{***}	0.176 ^{***}	0.0985 ^{**}	1	0.157 ^{***}	0.191 ^{***}	0.0722 [*]	1	0.413 ^{***}	0.0915	0.260 ^{**}	1


Notes: Bivariate correlation coefficients for four variables. It is calculated for the entire sample and the subgroups of men and women. The first three variables are the answers included in the aggressive behavior index (see table 7). The other variable included is the type index.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

Figure 1
Cuidacoches income



Notes: The figure plots the *cuidacoches* daily income by age for men and women separately. Income measured in 2013 Uruguayan pesos.


Figure 2
*Cuidacoche*s income (Kernel density)



Notes: Mean of *cuidacoche*s daily income for men and women in dashed lines. Income measured in 2013 Uruguayan pesos.

Figure 3

Cuidacoches income by months as *cuidacoches*



Notes: The figure plots the *cuidacoches* daily income by time as *cuidacoches*. The time as *cuidacoches* is measured in months and the income is measured in 2013 Uruguayan pesos.

Figure 4
Cumulative density of Aggressive Behavior Index





Figure 5
Correlation between Type Index and Aggressive behavior Index by age



Note: The coefficients of bivariate correlations are calculated for four age cohorts: 15-30, 30-45, 45-60 and over 60 years old. *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.